Last week Arizona officially lost control of health care in its state prisons when Judge Roslyn Silver (US Judge) appointed Annette Chambers-Smith as the receiver responsible for managing medical and mental-health care for the state of Arizona’s more than 25,000 inmates in state-run prisons.
Ex-Ohio prisons chief to handle Arizona prison health care
To understand how we got here, we gotta go back 15 years to a policy decision made by the Arizona Legislature & Governor Brewer.
The Privatization Decision
Back in the ‘Great Recession’ when I was ADHS director the Legislature was focused on any and all things they could do to cut state spending on virtually everything. A common narrative at the time was this is the time to make state government more “efficient” while drastically cutting agency budgets.
Then-Representative John Kavanagh sponsored House Bill 2154 in 2011, which required Corrections to privatize all the healthcare services that they were providing via state employees and ask for bids & award all the inmate healthcare the work to a private company.
Governor Brewer signed the bill in the spring of 2011, as an emergency measure – meaning it was supposed to take effect right away. Interestingly, the bill prohibited the ADOC from bidding on the contract.
Up until 2011 Corrections Director Chuck Ryan (and all earlier Corrections directors) were running a health-care system staffed by state-employed physicians, nurses, mental-health professionals, dentists and support staff.
Because of the bill, Ryan was charged with dismantling all their healthcare infrastructure, eliminating more than 750 state jobs and preparing a massive request for proposals (RFP) to hand responsibility for inmate health care to a private contractor.
It completely changed what the Department of Corrections was expected to do.
Providing Care and Managing a Contract Are Different
When an agency directly provides health care, it recruits the staff, trains and supervises them, manages the clinics, reviews medical outcomes and fixes problems inside its own chain of command.
After the bill took effect ADOC effectively just became a contract manager. That might sound easier to do on the surface – but it’s not easier (or likely to result in better outcomes) if the agency isn’t particularly good or experienced at large scale contract management.
That requires a different set of skills and a different organizational culture.
The contract needs clear expectations for staffing, access to care, specialty referrals, medication delivery, chronic-disease management, mental-health treatment and dozens of other outcomes.
The state needs reliable data systems to decide whether those expectations are actually being met… not just whether the contractor says they’re being met.
Then there needs to be clear enforcement provisions: corrective-action plans, financial penalties, payment offsets, suspension, nonrenewal and ultimately termination.
Most importantly, agency leadership has to be willing to use those provisions.
A contract is worthless if it’s not enforced.
Four Contractors Later
Wexford Health Sources took over prison health care on July 1, 2012. It lasted only about eight months before Corizon replaced it in March 2013.
Centurion became the third contractor in July 2019. NaphCare became the fourth in October 2022.
Through all those contractor changes, there were major problems with the contractor’s delivery of services – and my all accounts services were worse than when the state was running the system with their staff.
A lawsuit was filed (now called Jensen v. Thornell) and the plaintiffs and ADOC reached a settlement in 2014 that required the state to meet more than 100 health-care performance measures. ADOC and their contractors consistently did not achieve them.
The court imposed contempt sanctions in 2018 and again in 2021. Judge Silver eventually threw out the settlement, held a trial and ruled in 2022 that Arizona’s prison health-care system was “plainly grossly inadequate.”
A detailed injunction followed in 2023. When that didn’t work either, the judge ordered the receivership (earlier this year).
The Contract-Management Problem
I’m not enough of an insider to know exactly how much of this was caused by the contractors, how much was caused by insufficient legislative funding and how much was caused by ineffective Corrections leadership.
It’s probably some combination of all three.
But Judge Silver’s receivership order is direct about the contract-management piece.
The court found that the NaphCare contract included monetary sanctions, payment offsets, suspension, nonrenewal and even termination if the company failed to perform.
Yet the judge concluded that Corrections made little effort to enforce those obligations and imposed relatively few sanctions. At one point, the Department even asked the judge to force NaphCare to follow its own contract.
Judge Silver’s response said pound sand – that’s your job.
The Lesson
The Legislature treated prison health-care privatization like a fairly simple government-efficiency measure.
It wasn’t.
It was a massive transformation from direct service delivery to contract management. Meanwhile, the state agency responsible for managing the contract didn’t prepare an enforceable contract or manage it well (probably both).
Don’t get me wrong, I’m not arguing that this privatization scheme was doomed from the start. But it does show how precarious these transitions can be and how important it is to have the right leadership and funding in place to get good results.
Arizona failed that test for the last 15 years.
Now a federal receiver will try to do what four private contractors, several Corrections directors, numerous court orders and millions of dollars in litigation and contempt sanctions couldn’t do: provide adequate health care in Arizona’s prisons.






